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Abstract The evidence-based practice and evidence-based
medicine (EBM) movements have promoted standardiza-
tion through guideline development methodologies based
on systematic reviews and meta-analyses of best available
research. EBM has challenged clinicians to question their
reliance on practical reasoning and clinical judgement. In
this paper, we argue that the protagonists of EBM position
their mission as reducing uncertainty through the use of
standardized methods for knowledge evaluation and use.
With this drive towards uniformity, standardization and
control comes a suspicion towards intuition, creativity and
uncertainty as integral parts of medical practice. We
question the appropriateness of attempts to standardize
professional practice through a discussion of the impor-
tance of uncertainty. Greenhalgh’s taxonomy of uncer-
tainty is used to inform an analysis of the clinical reasoning
occurring in a potentially life threatening emergency situ-
ation with a young patient. The case analysis is further
developed by the use of the Canadian philosopher Bernard
Lonergan’s theory about understanding and objective
knowing. According to Lonergan it is not by getting rid of
or even by reducing uncertainty, but by attending system-
atically to it and by relating to it in a self-conscious way,
that objective knowledge can be obtained. The paper
concludes that uncertainty is not a regrettable and
unavoidable aspect of decision making but a productive
component of clinical reasoning.
Keywords Evidence-based medicine  Uncertainty 
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Introduction
More than 20 years ago while one of the authors (KH) was
working as a clinician on an acute hospital ward, she had
an experience she has since reflected on again and again.
Recently, she began to relate the experience to uncertainty.
The case is summarized below, but in order to protect the
patient and family’s confidentiality, certain characteristics
have been omitted and others changed.
Kristin had recently passed the national certification test
for nurse anesthetist and was employed as a trauma team
member. One evening, the team received a call from a
father who appeared to be terrified, reporting that his young
adult son was lying unconscious on the floor. As Kristin
was running towards the ambulance, the doctor on call
asked Kristin to be prepared for a cerebral hemorrhage. To
experience a young person with acute brain injury was
what Kristin (a newly qualified specialist clinician) feared
the most. She tried to remind herself about the standard
protocol, and wondered if she was up to date on recent
protocol changes. This made her nervous. The situation
was stressful; she knew she had to be calm and focused
both to cope with the situation and convey to the patient
and family the impression of being a skilled professional.
She repeated for herself the symptoms characteristic for
cerebral disorder and what she hoped was the hospital’s
current guidelines for immediate treatment. And she knew
all the questions the team would expect her to report on as
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well as giving them precise information about the emer-
gency scene and the patient’s condition. By the time she
approached the front door of the house, which was being
held open by the father, Kristin felt quite confident.
As she ran up the few steps to the entrance, something
strange happened. Kristin caught a glimpse of a woman
(probably the young man’s mother) sitting at the kitchen
table with a cup of coffee. This remarkably calm behavior
of a family member contrasted with the terrified impression
given by the young man’s father on the phone. Kristin still
has a vivid memory of how this astonishing impression
heightened her awareness to signs suggesting that the
unconscious young man might not be suffering from a
brain hemorrhage. She found the young man lying on the
floor in a poorly lit room. His respiratory rate was normal,
as was his blood pressure and pulse. He did not vomit, but
responded feebly when Kristin tried to make verbal contact
with him. He was cold and had perhaps been lying on the
floor for a while, which was also somewhat strange, given
that his parents were at home. She asked the young man’s
father whether he knew about any illness history and use of
medication. The father murmured some unclear words,
which Kristin interpreted as a sort of unwillingness to
answer. She looked around in the room for a couple of
seconds without finding evidence of pills and not knowing
what else to look for or question about. As she left the
house ready to bring the patient to the hospital, she asked if
the father would go with the ambulance to the hospital. No
clear answer. The ambulance left with the blue emergency
lighting and without the father.
To cut a long story short, the young man had taken an
overdose of medication in an apparent attempt to commit
suicide.
This experience still occupies Kristin’s mind and
inspires her interest in clinical reasoning, the intuitive side
of expertise, and the role of uncertainty in clinical decision-
making. There are several interesting aspects of her
uncertainty in the above case. One is the notion she orig-
inally held—that being a professional gives little or no
space for uncertainty. Rather, being professional entails
(we often assume) being fully abreast of the situation and
ready for action. Decisive action might of course be sen-
sible in a life threatening situation, but even when Kristin
anticipates the report she will have to provide to the trauma
team, she is initially convinced that only clear and exact
answers will be expected and there will be no place for
vagueness or guesswork. Indeed, uncertainty in clinical
practice is increasingly viewed as something to be resolved
rationally, given the growing emphasis on evidence-based
medicine (EBM) and standardization of health care.
Greenhalgh (2013) proposed a conceptual taxonomy of
uncertainty—uncertainty about the evidence (e.g. what do
the guidelines show?), about the narrative (what is the
patient’s story?), about case-based reasoning (what best to
do in the circumstances?) and about multi-professional
working (how best to communicate and collaborate?)—that
resonates with several aspects of Kristin’s experience.
When she does not fully recollect the relevant clinical
protocol, she experiences uncertainty in the evidence
‘‘where key questions relate to the completeness, accuracy,
and relevance of research-based evidence’’ (Greenhalgh
2013: 41). Secondly, Kristin also identified narrative
uncertainty, relating to the patient’s story, which lacked
coherence (for example, the mother’s calm demeanour, the
father’s incoherent response to Kristin’s questions and his
seeming unwillingness to go with the ambulance to the
hospital). Kristin’s hesitation about what sort of signs to
look for and how she best can inform her clinical judge-
ment is an example of what best to do in a particular
situation with this patient. The fourth category, uncertainty
about how a multidisciplinary team might co-ordinate
complex care, is illustrated by Kristin’s thoughts about how
the team will respond, knowing what she believes to be
their expectation for precise and clinically focused
answers. Would it be appropriate to reveal information of
uncertain relevance—for example about observed circum-
stances in the house? Would Kristin’s observations of the
coffee drinking mother and the father’s unwillingness to
answer contribute to a wider assessment of this case by the
clinical team? Initially, Kristin thought no.
Kristin could have searched to manage her uncertainties
and standardize her decisions through the use of formal
probabilistic assessments and Bayesian reasoning (Medow
and Lucey 2011). She could for instance have attempted to
estimate the probability of the patient having cerebral
hemorrhage given specific signs, symptoms or test out-
comes based on information about prevalence or frequency
of the condition within the relevant population and infor-
mation about the accuracy of the test. Whilst such an
approach might have reduced the uncertainty around some
aspects of the evidence (Greenhalgh’s first type) it would
not address all the other aspects of uncertainty present in
Kristin’s situation. More importantly, the Bayesian
approach builds on the assumption that controlling uncer-
tainties (through probability estimates) is the best way of
dealing with them. In this paper, we present a different
perspective on uncertainty: by exploring the different types
of uncertainty present in Kristin’s case, we raise the
question whether any of these uncertainties might have
played a productive role in her decision making. This
means shifting focus away from the dominant view of
uncertainty as a threat to evidence-based decisions into
viewing uncertainties as generative to informed decision
making [as Locke et al. (2008) have done in relation to
making doubt generative in the research process]. More
specifically, we will unpack the case presented above
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drawing on Bernard Lonergan’s theories about under-
standing and objective knowing and thereby explore pos-
sible subversive consequences of an increased
standardization of health care.
Standardization and ideals of evidence-based
medicine
During the last 50 years there has been a strong movement
towards standardization of medical practice through proto-
cols and clinical guidelines. Different methodologies have
been used to develop such documents with the common
ambition of creating predictability, accountability and
objectivity by streamlining processes (Timmermans and
Berg 2003). In the 70s and 80s, the dominant way of reaching
agreement about how to manage clinical situations was the
consensus panel, made up of experts who produced ‘con-
sensus statements’ based on a form of collective reasoning
that was generally opaque and unauditable. But from the
early 1990s, the evidence-based practice (EBP) and evi-
dence-based medicine (EBM) movements worked to pro-
duce new, standardized and auditable guideline development
methodologies based on systematic reviews and meta-anal-
ysis of best available research. According to Sackett’s much
cited definition, EBM is ‘‘the conscientious, explicit and
judicious use of current best evidence in making decisions
about the care of individual patients’’ (Sackett et al. 1996). In
line with this program statement, EBM has emphasized the
use of clinical guidelines and challenged clinicians to
question their reliance on pathophysiological reasoning and
unenhanced clinical judgement. Clinicians should instead be
trained in reading research literature and converting the
findings from published studies into probabilities according
to Bayesian principles of reasoning (Solomon 2015). Behind
EBM/P’s search for standards and methods is an ambition to
‘‘meet a need for ‘certainty’ and ‘structure’ in many pro-
fessionals and consumers alike’’ (Cluett 2006: 52).
Arguably, the overall aim of EBM is to reduce uncer-
tainty through the use of standardized methods for
knowledge evaluation and use. With this drive towards
uniformity, standardization and control comes a suspicion
towards intuition, creativity and uncertainty as integral
parts of medical practice (Greenhalgh 2013, 2014). This
paper questions the productivity of the attempts to stan-
dardize professional health care through a discussion of the
importance of uncertainty. We claim that uncertainty is not
a regrettable and unavoidable aspect of clinical decision
making but a productive component. We will build on the
Canadian philosopher Bernard Lonergan as well as analysis
of the emergency case and demonstrate the importance of
uncertainty for effective decisions.
Bernard Lonergan’s hermeneutics of knowing
Bernard Lonergan (1904–1984) was a Canadian theolo-
gian, philosopher, mathematician and economist. Although
he has perhaps had most impact within theological circles,
he has also made major contributions to the hermeneutics
of science with significance far beyond the domain of
theology. In his principal work Insight. A study of human
understanding [1992 (1957)] he developed a general theory
of how knowledge comes about. His ambitious aim was to
create a general method of understanding, a so called
generalized empirical method (GEM), applicable within all
science and practical reasoning. Lonergan’s approach
should be distinguished from the positivist thesis of the
unity of science, which claims that common scientific laws
apply everywhere and might be explored through methods
drawn from natural science. Lonergan’s claim is rather the
opposite: all science involves interpretation and therefore
needs methods not only for measurement and explanation
but for how to perform interpretation as part of the scien-
tific endeavor. Here, science might draw on insights from
hermeneutics and the human sciences. This need for
interpretation does not only concern science in a strict
sense but also clinical practice (Engebretsen et al. 2015).
Lonergan’s work is a criticism of what he considers to
be the domination of empiricism within modern science, a
criticism that resonates with the characteristic of EBM as
‘‘the last bastion of crude empiricism’’ (Greenhalgh 2013:
5). He refutes the idea that there is ‘‘an already out there
now real’’ that science should try to mirror (Lonergan
1992: 276). However, Lonergan’s argument is not merely a
social constructionist claim that our knowledge is histori-
cally and culturally situated and thus in its most extreme
consequence, never objective. Lonergan is a firm believer
in objective knowledge. But to Lonergan, objective
knowledge is not characterized by being in correspondence
with the world out there. Lonergan is an idealist, not an
empiricist. He sees objective knowledge as rooted in our
mind, not in experience. His ‘‘primary concern is not the
known but knowing’’ (Lonergan 1992: 12). Objective
knowledge is an endeavor, a verb not a noun. It is enacted
through the process of inquiry, not discovered. Lonergan
understands knowledge as performative, but in strictly
idealist and not social constructionist sense. Unlike more
recent scholars within the science and technology studies
tradition (e.g. Law and Mol 2002), Lonergan is not pri-
marily concerned with how scientific reasoning is consti-
tuted through practice but considers scientific reasoning as
a practice in itself. Reasoning is a technology, a craft. And
it is the quality of the reasoning that determines the quality
of the knowledge. In the above case example, Kristin does
not discover a set of pre-existing facts about the patient’s
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situation. Rather, she builds knowledge by working with
the clues as they emerge and putting them together. And
once this knowledge exists in Kristen’s mind, it can no
longer be reduced to the clues that started off the process
searching for insight. The knowledge does not correspond
with ‘‘what really happened’’. Through the performance of
knowing, the ‘‘what really happened’’ has changed in an
important way: it has become infused with meaning. This
meaning is not part of the events themselves but added by
Kristin through her act of inquiry. Kristin creates links
between events such as the patient’s symptoms, the mother
sitting at the kitchen table, the father’s unwillingness to
answer, and the young man’s cold body indicating that he
has been lying alone in his room for a while. Furthermore,
she organizes the events into categories based on what she
has experienced before and the observations broaden her
awareness and activate a doubt about the standard protocol
she was depending on as she entered the house. The
‘‘meaningful whole’’ that Kristin makes from the situation
is certainly based on real events, but it is not equal to those
events. There are events which are left out from the picture
she draws and there is information added to the events in
terms of knowledge about similar situations, relevant
medical conditions, different sets of guidelines and pro-
cedures etc. In short, Kristin’s knowledge is the result of a
complex intellectual endeavor, an act of creativity as much
as an act of observation.
Moreover, the knowledge she produces is (in a sense)
instant. It is created in the situation; it is a unique act of
knowing. Kristin does not address the complex clinical
problem through the simple application of evidence.
Rather, her knowledge is born out of her appraisal of an
extraordinary event or situation, which opens her eyes for
new signs which trigger her intelligence. It is the result of
an insight. Lonergan explains the notion of insight with a
detective story:
In the ideal detective story, the reader is given all the
clues yet fails to spot the criminal. He may advert to
each clue as it arises and needs no further clues to
solve the mystery. Yet he can remain in the dark for
the simple reason that reaching the solution is not the
mere apprehension of any clue, not the mere memory
of all, but a quite distinct activity of organizing
intelligence that places the full set of clues in a
unique explanatory perspective.
By insight, then, is meant not any act of attention or
advertence or memory but the supervening act of
understanding (Lonergan 1992: 3)
An insight cannot be forced. It can be prepared for
through the collection of clues. But the insight itself is not
an action but a cognitional event; it is the moment when the
clues fall into place. According to Lonergan, it ‘‘comes
suddenly and unexpectedly’’ and it is ‘‘a function not of
outer circumstances but of inner conditions’’ (Lonergan
1992: 28). Objective knowledge is thus not merely condi-
tioned by the world out there but a cognitional event. This
way, it is by definition uncontrollable. Objective knowl-
edge has the character of event and surprise and is thus in a
fundamental sense based on prior uncertainty. This point
bears close resemblance with Gadamer’s theory of ‘‘un-
derstanding as event’’ (Gadamer 2004). However, through
his concept of insight Lonergan puts more emphasis on the
self-conscious character of this event than Gadamer does.
Though sudden and unexpected, insights are never unno-
ticed. An insight presupposes meta-knowledge and meta-
cognition. Lonergan understands knowledge as ‘‘the per-
sonal appropriation of one’s own rational self-conscious-
ness’’ (Lonergan 1992: 769). We obtain objective
knowledge by attending to how our mind operates when
knowledge is obtained. Objectivity is self-appropriation. It
is the result of a gaze turned inwards not outwards. Thus it
does not exclude uncertainty but encompasses it. It is not
by rationally resolving or even reducing uncertainty but by
attending systematically to it and by relating to it in a self-
conscious way, that insightful objective knowledge can be
obtained. Lonergan’s idea of method implies the self-ap-
propriation of uncertainty rather than the reduction of it.
Lonergan’s method implies attending self-consciously
to our own insights on three different levels which he calls
experiencing, understanding and judging. Hence, the act of
knowing is not one act but a set of cognitional operations.
It refers to a cognitional apparatus. As we shall see,
uncertainty is an integral and productive part of all these
different activities.
Experiencing, understanding and judging
According to Lonergan, all knowing starts with a set of
data. The dataset is the subject matter of our understanding;
it is what triggers our understanding but is not yet under-
stood; what calls for explanation but is prior to any
explanation. Hence, the experiencing phase takes place
before the real knowing process starts. Yet, to delimit the
experiential basis for our understanding is not an easy task
and a major challenge in EBM. Answering the question
‘‘what counts as data?’’ is not merely about passive
recording of sensations but also an active process of
imagination. By imagination, we mean an ability to see in
your mind’s eye what is in the forefront of a situation, what
combination of various forms of knowledge (usually sev-
eral) is of relevance for acting here and now as well as arise
awareness for possible future consequences (Sutphen and
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Heggen 2015). In classical rhetoric, this faculty was called
‘‘evidentia’’ referring to the ability to produce a visual
impression on the listener through the ‘‘eyes of the mind’’
(Vasaly 1993). Thus experiencing is not just about
recording and sorting out perceptions, but it is also about
picturing information that is not immediately present to the
senses.
When Kristin arrives at the emergency scene, she must
observe: a young man unconscious on the floor; a woman
sitting at the kitchen table drinking coffee; the father hardly
answering when he is asked about his son. She must also
transcend her immediate sensations through the use of her
imagination: medication, despair, cold body, unwillingness
to answer questions—all these are factors that are possibly
present on the scene but not immediately observable.
Still, imagination is pre-reflective. It does not involve
meta-knowledge in terms of self-awareness about own
knowing and is thus prior to real understanding. As a
clinician, you have to learn and trust your ability to enter a
clinical scene with an open mind but still in a state of
readiness to respond. An open mind is different from an
empty mind and different from asking questions. It is a
state of free floating awareness.
However, already on this level, there is a form of
uncertainty involved: experiencing is about more than
simple recording of data that are present to the senses. The
ability of adding information that is not seen but imagined
introduces an element of uncontrollability and uncertainty
into the process: there is more to the case than you can see.
Without creativity and imagination, the clinician risks
overlooking important information.
When the clinician starts making sense of her data and
thus enters the understanding phase, a new element of
uncertainty is introduced, the question. Our intelligence
unfolds as an internal conversation, through asking and
answering questions (Lonergan 1992: 33–34). By asking
questions we become aware of what we do not know and
what we want to know; we are naming the unknown.
Hence, the question represents the appropriation of our
uncertainty. The act of questioning draws our attention to
what we do not know. At the same time, the question
orients us towards an answer. By asking questions we turn
our images into clues, like the detective in Lonergan’s
example. While knowing what we do not know, we
simultaneously know that knowledge can be obtained.
Hence, the question mediates between the known and the
unknown by identifying the ‘‘known unknown’’ (Lonergan
1992: 555). By asking a question we anticipate an answer.
Thus, questions are necessarily based on presuppositions or
heuristics. According to Lonergan, heuristics are anticipa-
tions of the known while still unknown, they are horizons
of expectation that guide our inquiry for knowledge
(Lonergan 1992: 60–62). This differs from searching for
guidelines or standards for best practice. We can only reach
an answer by anticipating and believing what is not certain.
In sum, our intelligence can only prepare itself for new
insights by maximizing our uncertainty through questions.
Furthermore, questions can be posed only by building on
uncertainty in terms of beliefs and anticipations. Uncer-
tainty is thus the vehicle in our inquiry for new knowledge.
In our case, Kristin’s inquiry for knowledge starts even
before she enters the emergency scene. In the moment she
receives the call and thus records the first pieces of data,
she begins her questioning: what might this be? The first
piece of data given to her apart from the basic initial details
is the interpretation of a colleague in the trauma team: be
prepared for a cerebral hemorrhage. Kristin starts ques-
tioning this information based on heuristics, i.e. already
acquired knowledge about similar conditions. This way she
is starting the process of defining what she does not know,
while at the same time directing her mind towards a pos-
sible answer. Her presuppositions guide her questioning:
Headache? For how long and with what characteristics?
Vomiting? Unconsciousness—for how long? Any known
history of illness? And so on.
Through this process, sensations and images are trans-
formed into ideas, concepts and definitions. While images
are the results of imagination, ideas are products of intel-
ligence, according to Lonergan (1992: 32). Ideas are self-
conscious images. Concepts are, in their turn, ideas that are
formulated explicitly and expressed in words and symbols.
While images are immediate and automatic, ideas imply
work, efforts, and conscious activities. At the same time,
ideas also presuppose an aspect of luck or gift. Ideas come
about through insights. You cannot force them to come;
you can only create the conditions where the insights are
likely to occur. There is always an element of surprise and
guesswork involved.
The mind work involved in understanding is clearly
reflected in our case: Kristin works on the data by repeating
for herself the symptoms characteristic for cerebral disor-
der, by reminding herself about the standard protocol and
what sort of information she should bring to the trauma
team. At the same time, the insight does not occur on
command but in a ‘‘glance’’. And what is particularly
interesting with Kristin’s insight is that when it occurs, it
changes her whole line of questioning. In a glance, she
understands that the direction of her questions has been
mistaken. Lonergan has named this particular kind of
insight ‘‘inverse insights’’ (Lonergan 1992: 43–50). This
type of insight is characterized by the realization that we
have been asking the wrong questions, we have been
barking up the wrong tree. The anticipations on which we
build our questions are mistaken. With Kristin’s reverse
insight a new set of questions is launched (Maybe it is a
suicide attempt or deliberate self-harm?) and with these
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questions, old data gain new meaning (the young man
being unconscious due to drug related overdose) and new
images call for interpretation (the father’s unwillingness to
give information about his son’s condition for instance).
Without re-orienting her questions, Kristin would not have
been able to get the clue. This shows that adequate inter-
pretation involves active awareness about the possibility of
misinterpretation. Derrida has latterly echoed this argument
in his theory about the possibility of misunderstanding as a
condition for all understanding (Derrida 1997). The knower
needs to be aware that any piece might also fit into a dif-
ferent or bigger puzzle. The answers she gets are products
of her line of questioning and a different set of questions
might produce different answers. This is not the same as
claiming that all answers are equally good. Rather, it is a
reminder that the knower must look critically at his ques-
tions, not only his answers. A true insight should take into
account that not only might its result be wrong but it might
also be sought in the wrong direction, by asking inadequate
questions. An insight is thus based on the possibility of its
own inversion. In more practical words, the mind must be
prepared for the possibility of inverse insights—if not, they
are unlikely to occur.
Lonergan also refers to this process of questioning the
data as abstraction, and he uses this term in a different way
from usual. Based on the argument above, Lonergan claims
that abstraction is not only about distilling the essence of
the data by putting aside aspects that are considered irrel-
evant. Abstraction also involves adding on to the data, or
enriching them by organizing them into already established
patterns or puzzles of knowledge (Lonergan 1992:
111–112). Thus, understanding does not occur through a
process of purification where the data are washed clean of
any outer interference. Rather, the meaning of the data is
brought into being through our intellectual processing and
creative nourishing of the data. Hence, although Kristin’s
first preliminary assumption (that the diagnosis was cere-
bral hemorrhage) was incorrect, she followed the right
procedure by drawing on her presuppositions to frame the
data. The key to her success was that she acknowledged the
uncertainty of her initial conclusions and the reversibility
of her insights.
Lonergan differs from other epistemologists by distin-
guishing between an understanding mode and a critical
mode in the inquiry for knowledge, between understanding
and judging. Understanding captures possibilities; we are
performing a kind of brainstorming by expanding our
vision and testing out drafts of interpretation. However, in
order to fulfill our inquiry for knowledge, we must also
appropriate the understanding and commit ourselves to a
particular interpretation. The knower must explore possi-
bilities, but he must also take a stand; he must evaluate and
verify the knowledge. Descartes did not differentiate
between these different modes of knowing which made
him conclude that the clearness and unambivalence of
insights were criteria for their truthfulness. According to
Lonergan, questions seeking for clearer understanding are
analytically distinct from questions asking for the trust-
worthiness of the understanding (Lonergan 1992: 106). By
mixing them up, like Descartes did, we risk both limiting
the creativity of the understanding process and the criticism
of the judging process.
Arriving at the emergency scene, Kristin does not ask
questions only in order to expand her understanding, she
also asks questions of reflection in order to verify her
interpretation: Is her new interpretation correct? Is it a
suicide attempt? These different sets of questions anticipate
different answers. While her questions of understanding are
exploring new information, like illness history, medication,
pulse and blood pressure etc., her questions of reflection
are looking for verification: It is a suicide attempt or it
isn’t. Is it eventually accidental or intentional? Her answer
is probable, possible, likely or undeterminable. Lonergan
emphasizes the argumentative aspect of this operation: it is
an act of weighing (Lonergan 1992: 304). The judgment is
not given from the facts. By making a judgement, the
doctor commits himself to one out of several possible
interpretations. The judgement makes the inquirer self-ac-
countable, according to Lonergan. It implies taking the
responsibility for a specific interpretation and at the same
time admitting that the interpretation could have been
different. It is an acknowledgement of uncertainty.
However, as earlier stated, Lonergan does not reject the
notion of objectivity. Rather, he redefines it. Objectivity is
an intellectual phenomenon, according to Lonergan. It is
obtained by reflecting back on the operations that you have
done in order to obtain understanding asking the reflecting
question: ‘‘Did I get it right?’’ You cannot validate your
knowledge by measuring the correspondence between your
knowledge and the ‘‘world out there’’, but by inspecting the
methods through which you formed your knowledge. As
soon as Kristin has formed her knowledge, she cannot
return to the data ‘‘as they were’’ before the process of
inquiry started. To measure the interpretation against some
pure and untouched data prior to interpretation, is thus an
impossible task. What she can do, however, is to look back
on her operations of understanding. Lonergan differs
between three concepts of objectivity which are interde-
pendent. Empirical objectivity or correct experiencing is
the first form. Here the essential judgment is: ‘‘did I
observe and/or imagine the situation in the right way?’’
This form of objectivity is however incomplete in itself and
must be complemented by normative objectivity which
depends on the following judgement: ‘‘have I asked every
conceivable question?’’ Still, this judgement must be fol-
lowed by a last judgement, which ensures absolute
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objectivity: ‘‘Have I asked the right questions?’’(Lonergan
1992: 402–407).
This way, it is not the result which is or is not objective
but the process. Objectivity is the name of the judicious
and transparent awareness of all operations involved in the
process of knowing. It is by reflecting back on this process
(Are my observations right? Have I asked all the questions?
Have I asked the right questions?) that objectivity is
ensured.
This process does not necessarily result in a clear cut
conclusion which rules out all uncertainty and doubt.
Rather is implies certainty about any possible uncertainties;
I am sure that I have taken all aspects into account and that
this is as far as I can get in the process of inquiry. Absolute
objectivity is not absolute certainty. Rather is it a judge-
ment which is absolute in the sense that it takes all
aspects—certainties as well as uncertainties—into account.
Uncertainty and decision making
According to Timmermanns and Berg, ‘‘standardization
has penetrated every corner of medicine’’ (2003: 3). EBM
aims to reduce uncertainty through the use of standardized
methods for the evaluation and use of knowledge. The aim
of this paper is to argue the opposite, namely the impor-
tance of uncertainty for making objective clinical deci-
sions. We will especially emphasize the following four
aspects of uncertainty:
Imagination
Following Lonergan, the experiencing phase starts before
the real knowing process and is not a passive recording of
data as if one is following a standard procedure. It is an
active process of imagination, and a vivid awareness about
the situation you are a part of. Imagination is an ability to
see in your mind’s eye and picturing information that is not
immediately present to the senses (as Kristin perceives that
there might be something in the relationship between the
son and his parents). This ability to act with awareness for
additional not seen information implies uncertainty.
This initial phase of understanding is pre-reflective, not
involving conscious questioning about your knowing. As a
health care provider you have to trust your ability to enter a
clinical scene with an open mind which is different from a
distant observational clinical gaze, at the same time as you
are ready to respond and act.
Reflective questioning
As Lonergan explains, our intelligence can only prepare
itself for new insights by maximizing our uncertainty
through questions. When asking questions we become
aware of what we do not know and want to know and can
direct our attention in order to seek knowledge. The
question is in itself a new aspect of uncertainty and a driver
for knowledge. By questioning you identify the ‘‘known—
unknown’’ as expressed by Lonergan. Kristin works with
what she does not know, with active questioning, in order
to obtain knowledge about the situation.
Understanding as an event and surprise
A health care provider has to be prepared for the possibility
of inverse insights meaning that both question and answer
might be inadequate. Without introducing this aspect of
uncertainty inverse insights and surprising answers are not
likely to occur. This insight does not occur on command
but in a ‘‘glance’’. And what is particularly interesting with
Kristin’s insight is that when it occurs, it changes her whole
line of questioning. At that moment, she understands that
the direction of her questions has probably been wrong.
Hence, understanding involves active awareness about the
possibility of misinterpretation.
Critical judgement
Critical judgement is an introduction of uncertainty as a
weighing of argument underpinning your interpretation. In
Kristin’s case it is a verification of whether or not the
young man is unconscious as a consequence of a suicidal
attempt or a cerebral hemorrhage. It is about taking the
responsibility for one’s interpretation and at the same time
acknowledging that the interpretation could have been
different.
EBM does not provide any instrument for handling the
complexity of real world situation. It offers only simplifi-
cation through the use of standards. This search for stan-
dardization and minimization of uncertainty risk producing
adverse effects: As Lonergan has shown, it is by drawing
on our uncertainties that knowledge based decisions are
possible. The lack of awareness of the different aspects of
uncertainty involved in decision making might therefore
hamper an objective clinical decision.
Uncertainty and objective knowledge
In the EBM literature, the relationship between uncertainty
and objective knowledge is often understood as dichoto-
mous. The dominant question is: how can we reduce
uncertainty by building on standards and protocols that
ensure objective judgement? Drawing on Lonergan, we
claim that this question is misleading and based on a
mistaken understanding of objective knowledge. Rather
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than searching for objectivity through standardization,
streamlining and reduction of uncertainty, we claim that
objective knowledge can only be obtained by attending to
one’s uncertainty on different levels of the process of
inquiry. EBM is built on an empiristic understanding of
objective knowledge as the simple correspondence
between perceptions and ‘‘the world out there’’. Our
diagnostics and treatment of the patient shall correspond to
the ‘‘real’’ condition. This may be obtained, it is assumed,
by following standardized recommendations built on clin-
ical research. As opposed to this view, we claim that
objective knowledge can never be obtained by just fol-
lowing the protocol guided by research. Imagination and
creativity are prerequisites for objective knowledge.
Objectivity can only be obtained through imagination,
reflective questioning, openness for surprises and critical
judgement. Hence, objectivity is in a certain sense the
opposite of protocols and standards. Objectivity is instant
knowledge (Lillehagen et al. 2016), it exists here and now,
it is a unique event occurring in a particular situation and
setting. Thus objectivity is per se a risky business.
Objective knowledge involves uncertainty; it implies tak-
ing a risk and being taken by surprise.
What we suggest is thus a different conception of evi-
dence than the one dominant within EBM. We do not
refute the concept of evidence; on the contrary, we
embrace it and redefine it. Evidence—or objective medical
knowledge—is not a package capturing the world inde-
pendent of the concrete situation and setting. Evidence is
an endeavor; it is a concrete act of knowing or ‘‘evidence
basing’’ (Bohlin and Sager 2011). Thus it cannot be
obtained by simply following an ‘‘evidence-based’’
guideline or protocol. It must be created here and now.
Evidence is thus about attending consciously to the process
of inquiry and in a sense, similar to a judge attending
consciously and transparently to the procedures through
which he reaches his conclusion. In legal theory, the right
decision is not equal to the law. The right decision does not
follow from the sources (the law) but must be taken in a
concrete situation following a certain procedure (legal
methodology). The right decision is built up through a
structured, self-conscious and transparent endeavor, not by
simply following the law. We believe that EBM needs a
similar attention to how evidence comes about in a con-
crete situation and not only what evidence is in terms of the
best available sources/standards of knowledge.
Postscript
This paper has considered clinical uncertainty from the
perspective of the philosophy of clinical knowing but there
are many parallels in the field of research—and a parallel
literature in the philosophy of scientific knowing. Sir Peter
Medawar, for example, wrote about the crucial role of
imagination and surprise in the generation and testing
(respectively) of scientific hypotheses (Medawar 1969).
More recently, Locke et al. (2008), writing in the field of
organisational case study and drawing on the pragmatist
philosopher Charles Pierce, have considered the role of
doubt in the research process. Like Lonergan, Locke et al.
view doubt not as an undesirable phenomenon that needs to
be resolved through validation but as an essential compo-
nent of the scientific method. Without doubt, and the
careful reflection on doubt, the process of conjecture
essential to scientific discovery cannot begin. Just as evi-
dence-based medicine sometimes wrongly assumes that
clinical reasoning occurs only or primarily by deduction
from ‘facts’, so a naı¨ve framing of scientific research
wrongly assumes that scientific deduction holds primacy
over scientific abduction (the act of asking ‘‘what is there
here to explain?’’ and ‘‘what might explain what needs to
be explained?’’). But that is a subject for another paper.
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